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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a longitudinal interpretive case study of a UK bank’s efforts to combat 
Money Laundering (ML) by expanding the scope of its profiling of ML behaviour. The concept of 
structural coupling, taken from systems theory, is used to reflect on the bank’s approach to 
theorize about the nature of ML-profiling. The paper offers a practical contribution by laying a 
path towards the improvement of money laundering detection in an organizational context while 
a set of evaluation measures is extracted from the case study. Generalizing from the case of the 
bank, the paper presents a systems-oriented conceptual framework for ML monitoring. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the critical role of technology in tackling money laundering (ML), this socially important 
phenomenon has been examined sparingly in Information Systems (IS) research [1, p.115], 
typically from technical perspectives that focus on algorithmic optimizations alone. By and large, 
these approaches have failed. While algorithmic optimizations remain important and technology 
is central to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) efforts [2], a richer nexus of intertwined human- and 
technology-generated decisions supports the identification of ML-behaviour. This paper is 
motivated by the desire to find a way forward in improving money laundering detection (true 
positive rates), exploring ML-detection challenges within a real organizational context and 
extracting evaluation metrics for AML that can assist the key decision makers. In an attempt to 
uncover what elements affect ML-profiling beyond algorithmic techniques, this paper explores 
these challenges in the richer context of a case study. This paper focuses on banks, which remain 
the main avenue for ML activity [3]. For example, in the UK, banks file more than 85% of 
potential ML-activity to the authorities by submitting Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) [4].  
     By presenting an in-depth longitudinal case study of a UK bank in the interpretivist tradition 
[5, 6], this paper follows the bank’s efforts to improve ML-detection. This research is based on 
two different but connected EU-funded projects spanning approximately 2.5 years in total 
(JAI/2004/AGIS/182 and SEC6-PR-205800). The case is enriched by data from other key project 
stakeholders (including asset recovery agencies, financial intelligence agencies, central banks, 
police, and other banks from the UK and abroad that were project partners).  
     The paper uses the concept of structural coupling from systems theory to depict the dynamic 
relationship between computer profiling and human profiling in the targeting of ML; structural 
coupling also helps us organize the interactions and reflect on the way the balance between 
information/redundancy is expressed. The paper provides a practical contribution for improving 
the True Positive Rate (TPR) of Transaction Monitoring Systems (TMS) and extracts AML 
evaluation measures that can be considered by key decision makers within AML systems. The 
development of a systems-theoretical conceptual framework for ML detection synthesizes the 
theoretical contribution (Figure 1). The structure of the paper is as follows: a) in the literature 
review, the substantive problem (ML) is reviewed briefly in tandem with IS-related influences; 
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second, the core theoretical concept of structural coupling drawn from systems theory; b) the 
methodology; c) the description of the case study and its analysis; d) the discussion, where the 
findings and the concepts are used in light of the theory to outline the contributions; e) research 
limitations, suggestions for future research; f) conclusions.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1. (Anti-)Money Laundering and Information Systems Research 
ML constitutes the process of masking monetary gain resulting from any type of criminal activity 
(e.g. drug & human trafficking, fraud, extortion, kidnap-for-ransom); the totality of such criminal 
activities associated with ML are labelled as predicate offences, but ML is also considered a 
crime on its own [7, 8]; thus, someone can be charged with drug trafficking & money laundering 
in a combined prosecution (or indeed, separately if the laundering activity is facilitated by an 
associate). The purpose of ML is to create the appearance that money generated by predicate 
criminal offences has a legitimate source [9]. Ultimately, the conversion into legal money assists 
criminals to benefit from the formal financial system, thereby gaining them more flexibility in the 
movement of funds that may subsequently be used to fund further crime. Despite difficulties in 
estimating the size of underground markets [1, p.13, 10], ML is estimated to account for between 
$1.5trillion to $2.85trillion annually [11, 12], making it the world’s third largest market [13, 14]. 
     In the IS literature, ML is significantly under-researched despite early calls by Mumford [15, 
p. 258] who considered it an important research problem and Demetis [1] who studied the 
phenomenon by looking at the AML risk-based approach and technology. Furthermore, the 
semantic ambiguity in how ML has been framed within IS has created some confusion in how it 
is approached. For example, Chung, Chenb, Changc and Chouc [16, p.671] view it in the context 
of cybercrime, even though money laundering rarely involves a security breach or a 
hardware/software compromise of financial systems. Ngai, Hu, Wong, Chen and Sun [17, p. 561] 
see it as part of financial fraud; as we shall see in the case study, that remains equally problematic 
from both organizational and detection perspectives. Of course, ML itself rarely involves 
deception that results in personal or institutional loss of a financial nature; quite the contrary: 
most launderers are happy to pay tax if that means legitimizing their profits and banks usually 
profit from ML activities. Even in the highest-recorded financial fine levied (against HSBC), the 
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bank remained relatively unscathed as it settled for $1.9bn (when accused of laundering money 
for Mexican drug cartels) and turned a net profit in the same year. While ML is related to 
cybercrime, fraud, and risk [18, p.609], this paper calls for it to be treated as a stand-alone 
phenomenon, characterized by distinct stages; it aligns with Pramod and Gao who emphasize the 
importance of working on conceptual frameworks related to AML itself [19].  
     The limited number of IS articles dealing with ML has focused mostly on ML-detection 
through clustering, classification [20], sequence analysis [16, 21], outlier detection [17, 22], and 
real-time detection for ML-monitoring [23]. Attributing ML-risk scores to individual customers 
[24] has also been explored in the context of a risk-based approach to AML [25]. Meanwhile 
network recognition [26] is increasingly emphasized, as terrorist financing has become an integral 
part of the AML-regime [27]. But while there seems to be agreement that ML-detection is very 
challenging, scholars in this domain describe possible techniques decontextualized from an 
organizational setting. Also, they do not discuss the True Positive Rates (TPR) of ML-monitoring 
systems and the challenges that specific financial institutions face in improving those. For 
example, Drezewksi, Sepielak and Filipkowksi [22] describe the broader computational 
architecture that would be required to tackle ML while Khan [24] describes how Bayesian 
networks can assist detection. However, no TPRs are recorded or described in an applied banking 
environment. Ngai [15] does mention the importance of looking at false positives and false 
negatives in a business context but this is not investigated at an empirical level. Canhoto and 
Backhouse [31] mention how most financial institutions experience very low True Positive Rates 
in a general profiling context of customers (often <1%) due to: the underground nature of the 
problem, the complex behaviour of launderers in their efforts to obfuscate the money trail, and the 
sheer volume of banking transactions [28], but they do not relate or explore AML profiling 
strategies and options for TPR development. Just how persistent this problem of low TPRs in 
ML-detection has been is evident in the results of a wide survey conducted by PwC to its AML-
customers where “PricewaterhouseCoopers analysis indicates that 90 percent to 95 percent of all 
alerts generated by AML alert engines are false positives. These high false-positive rates lead to 
significant monitoring costs” [29, p.1] while further liabilities also occur from non-compliance 
and the actual costs can be significantly higher. In summary, previous work is deficient as TPR 
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improvements are not reviewed against a real organizational setting so the challenges that 
decision makers face (and the impact) is decontextualized from technology applications in AML. 
More recent research reinforces the concern that serious problems lurk in ML detection, and calls 
for far more emphasis to be placed on personnel-training [2]. Indeed, while technology remains 
essential for filtering financial transaction data for ML [30], banks have largely failed to 
implement AML-specific IS [18]; these have been unsuccessful, overloaded users with white 
noise [31] and largely failed to support the decisions of ML analysts and the key decision makers 
who corroborate/dismiss ML-suspicions. This has had a negative impact in both banks and 
regulators. Yet, despite technology’s central role in ML detection, technology monitoring in AML 
has not been advanced theoretically or practically. This paper is motivated by the aforementioned 
gaps. It deconstructs how TPR improvements can be achieved, introduces AML evaluation 
measures and develops a systems theoretical-oriented conceptual framework for ML detection.  
     In order to put the ensuing discussion into context, we turn to a few core AML concepts. First, 
ML can be considered to have three distinct stages: the placement stage where illegally earned 
money enters the financial system; the layering stage, where the money trail is deliberately 
complicated in order to avoid detection; and the integration stage, where money becomes part of 
the legitimate economy and used to fund other illegal and even legal activities. While technology 
supports AML-related work across all three stages (and the ensuing discussion applies to all 
three), the most critical stage for detecting ML is considered to be placement as it poses the 
highest risk for the launderers before breaking up the transactions and moving funds [32]. In 
order to put the role of technology into perspective, it is important first to review the lifecycle of 
reporting of suspicious transactions. Customers transact with financial institutions in a number of 
ways (ATMs, branches, e-banking, etc). Checking for ML activity typically takes place through 
Transaction Monitoring Systems (TMS) that profile ML behavior through the batch processing of 
3-months of data at regular intervals (e.g. daily, weekly, monthly). The output is alerts (suspects 
on ML) and is subsequently evaluated manually by a dedicated team of ML analysts who decide 
whether the transaction(s) are indeed suspicious enough to be escalated internally or put on file. If 
suspicion is corroborated, the analysts will escalate the case to the Money Laundering Reporting 
Officer (MLRO). The MLRO’s role is central; she is the only designated individual within the 
©2019, Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
6 of 33 
bank that is authorized to file a formal Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) to the Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU), the national aggregator of the country where the institution is based (the 
FIU also forwards SARs to prosecution authorities). Thus, the MLRO is a key decision maker. 
      Admittedly, different theoretical approaches can be used to study AML in relation to IS, but 
systems theory is selected here for four main reasons. First, ML and AML co-evolve; systems 
theory (and structural coupling in particular) can enable us to conceptualize this co-dependency. 
Second, we follow Mumford's [15] call for using systems theory to deconstruct ML. Third, 
though the IS community has focused around social theorists like Giddens [33] and Latour [34], 
and more recently socio-materiality [35, 36], systems theory is built into the very roots of 
information systems [37]; with it, IS research can expand its ways of theorizing. Finally, society’s 
excessive reliance on technology [38, 39] places significant demands on IS research for 
integrating theoretical perspectives that help us understand increasingly complex phenomena 
[40]. This paper aligns with the aspiration that IS research should take systems theory seriously 
[37] and the study of AML offers a fruitful ground of exploration within IS.  
2.2. The concept of structural coupling in systems theory 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the history of systems concepts [41] or 
deconstruct the exceptions of its use in IS research (e.g. [42]), it is recognized that systems 
concepts have been used in work [44], user-centered design [45, 46], design theory [47], 
information growth [48] and others [49]. Here we focus on the core concept of structural 
coupling. This helps us reflect on the relationship between computer and human profiling and 
organize the different AML structural couplings. Other systems concepts presented in this 
section, help us illustrate – and are in support of – the concept of structural coupling. 
All branches of systems theory agree that we can distinguish between a system and its 
environment [50]. A boundary lies between system/environment, and is part of both. The 
connection and the co-evolution between a system and its environment, is captured in the concept 
of structural coupling, introduced by Maturana and Varela [51]. Any structural coupling is a 
highly selective set-up; not everything that exists in the environment will be structurally coupled 
with the system [52]. What is selected by a system, specifies what can be channeled into it. This 
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is labeled a “canalisation of causalities” [50, p.85]: a necessary selection of limited pathways that 
structure how system/environment interact. Through such pathways, the system becomes 
sensitive to specific irritations of the environment while it ignores others [51]. For example, “the 
brain is structurally coupled with the external environment via eye and ear. It thus possesses a 
very narrow bandwidth of sensibilities that produces what can be seen, limits the spectrum of 
colours, and equally reduces what can be heard. It is only because things are this way that the 
system is not overburdened with external influences” [50, p.86]. The irritations received by the 
system are interpreted as information and prompt it to adjust [50], leading it to either: a) structural 
development, where irritations from the environment will be exploited to the system’s benefit, b) 
structural drift, where such irritations undermine the system’s ability to control itself.  
     An information system tackles environmental complexity by transmuting data to information. 
Data are channeled (from environment to system), internalized and transformed into “information 
(that) is a product of the system itself and not something which exists out there” [53, p.258]. An 
illustrative example is the use of search engines (e.g. Google). After the user’s search query, the - 
typically - tens of millions of results become irrelevant. In order for the user to transform the data 
into information, he/she is forced to engage in human profiling: a selection of will be internalized 
(i.e. read by the user) and what will be ignored. Thus, the top 30 results from a search get over 
90% of traffic [54]; everything else is dismissed. Eventually, in information systems, structural 
coupling can be perceived to expand and reframe the notion of computer/human interaction into 
another expression: the distinction (and structural coupling) between information and redundancy 
[55]. Redundancy is equally (if not more) important in eliminating the demand for (and interest 
in) further information; it protects the system from being overburdened with external influences 
(similar to our sensory example). In this regard, information systems are also redundancy 
systems. Structural coupling then plays a pivotal role in conceptualizing how an (information) 
system interacts with its environment, and sets up its own structures in order to exploit the (data) 
resources of the environment. In summary: structural coupling between a system (e.g. AML 
department) and its environment implies a ‘canalisation of causalities’ (from environment to 
system). Environmental stimuli are internalized by the system as data and the system’s internal 
structures converts them to (an output of) information. The concept of structural coupling 
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illustrates the sensitivity (of the system) to the environment in the process of absorbing 
environmental data through specified canals, as well as optimizing these selections based on 
whether they result in information or redundancy. This also applies to subsystems of the system; 
for example, if we consider the AML department of a bank as a system, then its environment will 
include other departments within the bank, as well as the external – to the bank - environment.   
3. Research Methodology 
A combination of data collection methods was used during the 2.5 years of the EU-funded 
projects on which this research is based (JAI/2004/AGIS/182 and GATE SEC6-PR-205800). This 
includes individual interviews, project meetings (typically a full-day event every two months), 
interviews during on-site visits to Bank X (as well as other institutions), an experiment with 
anonymized raw transaction data, as well as feedback from dissemination seminars from high-
profile events in London, Rome, Athens, Dublin, and Barcelona. While there are research design 
challenges in using a mixed-method approach, in the context of a domain like AML where critical 
information is held by different stakeholders, a mixed-method approach provides a richer picture 
[56]. Due to both the criticality of the domain and confidentiality agreements, at no point was the 
researcher given access to any personally identifiable information from Bank X or from other 
sources. Also, as the project involved other researchers, the author did not include on-site visits to 
all project partners, but focused mostly in Bank X (which is the main case study presented in this 
paper). The concept of structural coupling guided theoretical development and data collection by 
exploring different types of system (i.e. Bank X)/ environment interactions (different forms of 
structural coupling are expressed in Table 2). Structural coupling also helped reframe interactions 
(e.g. between computer/human profiling) as a structural coupling that is expressed by the 
distinction between information/redundancy. This has implications for information systems as 
information is seen as structurally coupled with, and depended on, redundancy; this reframing is 
of particular interest in domains like AML where such structural couplings are shaping the key 
constructs of the domains in which they are applied (e.g. shaping who will be considered as a 
suspect and who will be forwarded for prosecution). Details on the data used for the analysis and 
the profiles of interviewees of Bank X are presented in the table below (Table 1). These are 
accompanied with important ethical considerations and confidentiality issues.  
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Partner 
Institution 
Data types used/collected by 
the researcher  
Ethical considerations and Confidentiality issues  
(these prohibit disclosing actual names of individuals and masking institutions’ names where possible) 
Financial 
Regulator 
Personal notes during project 
meetings 
Not applicable as any regulatory representation was fundamentally disclosing information that was already publicly 
available.  
Law 
Enforcement 
Personal notes during project 
meetings 
Access to sensitive information, which at the time could not have been disclosed, involved: techniques for terrorist 
financing and the cost of attacks in the London Underground on 7/7.  
Bank X 
 
(focus of 
research in 
how it 
becomes 
structurally 
coupled with 
other entities 
in the 
environment 
for AML 
improvement) 
Personal notes, e-mails, 
profiling schemes, raw 
transaction data for 
experiment/visualization, 
models for monitoring ML, 
semi-structured interviews.  
1) Names of customers could not have been disclosed and full anonymization was necessary in the context of the 
bank releasing 250 million financial transactions (corresponding to three months of data). 2) While the general model 
and principles of modeling ML-behaviour were discussed and created the basis for a number of developments/ 
considerations, the actual thresholds being applied could not have been disclosed for all parameters.  
   Profiles of interviewees 
Title Job Description 
Money Laundering Reporting Officer 
(MLRO) 
Manages the AML department, Files SARs to the FIU and reports to the board of directors. The MLRO is the 
key decision maker in the bank in the domain of AML. 
AML Manager Responsible for SQL queries in the transaction monitoring system; manages a small team of ML-analysts who 
go through the submitted reports and check them for due diligence.  
Deputy AML Manager Assists the AML Manager in his duties and works mostly on the scorecard system of risk 
ML-analyst Conducts due diligence and checks transaction history/behavior of suspected customers 
 
Banks Y,Z  Personal notes during project 
meetings, profiling models, TPR 
measurements in AML 
These Bank cases are not used in the context of this paper.  
Financial 
Intelligence 
Unit (FIU) 
Personal notes during project 
meetings 
High-level issues with Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), guidance on potential monitoring techniques were 
discussed frequently. ML-monitoring application consequences at FIU-level were the main focus.  
Central Bank Personal notes during project 
meetings, e-mail 
communications, profiling 
structures at national level, ML-
modeling frameworks  
In one case, the central bank acted as the FIU as well with a unique scope of pro-active analysis and modeling of ML 
in the national context. Sensitive techniques that would combine different types of behaviours for ML and that have 
led to the identification of suspects have been redacted. 
 
Table 1: Types of data analyzed, ethical and confidential considerations 
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All interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format, allowing the flexibility to explore any 
interesting emergent lines of enquiry. The objective of the interviews was to explore the approach 
of Bank X to its difficulties with ML-monitoring. In analyzing mostly qualitative data, an 
unavoidable process of categorization takes place. In the context of this research, and as scholars 
have analyzed [57-61], this resembles the following 3-stage process: A) open coding (of the 
broader research domain): AML and the role of technology in identifying suspicious behaviour; 
B) axial coding (themes selected): problems of Bank X in the use of transaction monitoring 
systems, identification of different data sources for integration into ML-profiling (presented in 
Table 2); and C) selective coding (last pass of incorporating further data elements): developing 
profiling strategies for the improved detection of money laundering.  
4. Case Study of Bank X in the UK  
4.1. Background to Bank X and its use of transaction monitoring (relating to Phases 1&2) 
In order to avoid confusion in terminology, we will treat the AML department of Bank X as 
our system (in the systems theoretical sense); any software installations (e.g. Transaction 
Monitoring System) will be labeled by their abbreviations (e.g. TMS) or referred to as software.  
Bank X is an important financial institution in the UK, focusing mostly on retail banking with 
branches throughout the country. The bank handles almost half a billion transactions in a quarter; 
due to the volume, the ML-monitoring of any form of transacting (e.g. e-banking, use of 
credit/debit/pre-paid cards, ATM, face-to-face) is down to filtering/monitoring data by automated 
means. Transactions are profiled for spotting potential ML behavior but then, due to regulatory 
requirements and the conduct of due diligence, ML-analysts have to scrutinize the technology-
generated reports and decide whether suspicion can be corroborated or dismissed (a number of IS 
support ML-analysts in this process but the TMS is the most important). For conducting such 
manual checks, the AML department employs several analysts (~10) that review suspicious ML-
cases on a daily basis. The ML-analysts evaluate the overall financial position and transacting 
behavior of technology-flagged suspected customers.  
Bank X had implemented an off-the-shelf TMS that would: a) deal with the volume of raw 
transaction data (past 3 months of transactions), b) model ML-behaviour in a set of SQL rules, c) 
apply the profiles onto transactions in a batch-processing mode every night so that, d) flagged 
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ML-suspects would be investigated further by ML-analysts the following day. Unfortunately, 
according to a ML analyst, when the bank implemented the TMS, it entered a “prolonged period 
of havoc” with a severe negative impact to the MLRO as the key decision maker (the MLRO was 
experiencing an extreme imbalance between information/redundancy due to the skyrocketing 
number of internal ML-related reports from the technology). Having experienced a reasonably 
straightforward implementation of credit-card anti-fraud software, the bank was surprised by the 
extremely low True Positive Rate (TPR). The TPR was calculated by the bank as the following 
percentage: TPRTMS=[(CRML-Analysts/ATMS)*100]% where ATMS was the total number of Alerts 
generated by the TMS and scrutinized by staff whereas CRML-Analysts was the number of 
Corroborated Reports after ML-analysts conducted a thorough analysis those alerts. So, if for a 
given month, the ML-analysts had work-capacity to scrutinize 100 alerts from the TMS and only 
5 would be labelled as ‘truly suspect’ then the TPRTMS would be 5%. Both lack (at first) and then 
scarcity of feedback from the FIU, meant that the bank relied on this internal metric for gauging 
its efforts in ML detection. A different metric TPRstaff was taken for ML-suspicions forwarded to 
the AML team by staff members from the branch network, substituting ATMS for AStaff. The latter 
fluctuated from about 40% to 65% for well trained staff – performing a lot better than technology 
as subtle face-to-face interactions often gave rise to suspicious behavior (a window of detection 
that is en route to becoming marginalized as e-banking becomes dominant). Also, the final 
decision on whether a ‘truly suspect’ SAR from the TMS would be sent to the FIU is taken by the 
MLRO, the key decision maker in the bank.   
     Evidently, in the context of the TPRTMS, the percentage was influenced by what queries were 
used by the bank. The AML-software vendor had preconfigured around 100 SQL queries (system 
rules), from which the bank initially activated 7-8 (those they deemed to be capturing important 
ML techniques). Automated alerts from the TMS would be listed out in a queue each morning 
and indicate the particular system rule which has been hit, together with a finite amount of static 
data from the main legacy system that held the details of the product and customer. These alerts 
would then be allocated to an analyst and reviewed/worked in the same way as a SAR from a 
member of staff. The choice of 7-8 rules was the first important reduction in complexity: a highly 
selective conditioning through which specified ML behavioral indicators aligned the system with 
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part of its environment (money launderers). More specifically, a very limited subset of ML-
behaviour was framed within the 7-8 queries alone; this selection channeled potential ML-
behaviour and enabled the system to react (support the determination of suspicion and forwarding 
to the FIU for further analysis/prosecution). In effect, the bank, or the AML department to be 
more specific, reconfigured its structural coupling with its environment (the money launderers) by 
re-arranging the mechanism through which the distinction between information/redundancy 
would be instantiated.  
Although the 7-8 queries were selected with caution by the bank in the hope of uncovering 
truly suspicious cases, the TPRTMS was less than 0.1%. ML-analysts would check 1,000 
suspicious alerts manually before finding one worthy of escalation. After two years of trial-and-
error in query-adjustment, the bank raised the TPRTMS to 1.42%, while the cost to the bank for 
checking false positives alone was around £450,000/year (with other costs for non-
compliance/fines creating additional risk for the bank). The very low TMS success rate had a 
serious impact in key stakeholders. ML-analysts were demotivated and demoralized from having 
to check very large numbers of false positives and their decisions were influenced by their TMS-
use (they were more inclined to dismiss a technology-based case). Also, MLROs were adversely 
affected by the volume of suspicions but had to defend the bank’s use of AML technology in 
regulatory audits. Based on several interviews, the difficulties were attributed to several factors: 
a) with ML connected to serious criminal activities (e.g. drug trafficking), launderers exercise 
caution when placing money into the financial system; b) banks operate as ‘silos’, and software 
typically monitors ML-behaviour based on raw transaction data; while convenient for 
operational reasons, ML behaviour is far more complex; c) databases degenerate and profiling is 
based on data that is incomplete, unsound, polluted by mistaken manual entries, etc.; d) there is 
minimal feedback from the FIU to the bank. 
To put it in the words of another MLRO, “…we pass on almost every case that is generated by 
the software - let the authorities worry about it; besides, how are we supposed to know whether in 
a national context the case does not make sense? We don’t have access to the transacting data of 
other banks, or tax information from HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs)” That 
approach that led to a staggering increase of SARs in the UK (up by almost 150,000 SARs from 
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20,000 SARs within a decade). Technology-supported decisions by MLROs created massive 
ambiguity in AML with information becoming intertwined with redundancy (and noise). Bank X 
sought to refine its approach as the very low TPRTMS was perceived as structural drift; it also 
raised management concerns of how much money can actually be spent on AML compliance. The 
bank tried to find ways through which the computer profiling of the large volume of transacting 
data would assist the subsequent human profiling (by ML-analysts) achieve better TPRTMS 
results. The sections that follow describe these efforts towards structural development in brief.  
4.2. Visualizing transactions and ‘ML transactions’ (relating to Phase 3 – Step 1) 
One technique that was explored was the dynamic visual exploration of 250 million anonymised 
financial transactions (with Datadesk software – Appendix 1). While visual exploration became 
difficult as the number of categories increased (not computationally impossible, just user 
unfriendly), some promising reflections were gained through it. Instead of visualizing all 
transactions, Bank X isolated from its AML Case Management System, only those accounts that 
corresponded to already-flagged and suspicious customers (but only where the suspicion 
originated by staff members that had a high success rate in detection; this set out to exploit a 
structural coupling between ATMS and ASTAFF). By applying that recursively to transaction data, it 
extracted and then visualized the corresponding transaction data of (potential) money launderers; 
this led to some surprising results: while the AML department was expecting that laundering 
would be spread out across a spectrum of categories, the visualization indicated otherwise and led 
to the decision to restructure the information/redundancy dynamics of the AML department.  
For example, out of a total of 99 transaction categories recorded in the transacting databases 
(e.g. deposit of cash would be one category, ATM withdrawal another, ATM deposit another, and 
so on across all products), it was only 14 transaction categories that were eventually identified as 
relevant to ML for the bank (this was based on ten years of recorded suspicious cases). From the 
14 categories, it surfaced that the biggest transacting category for money launderers was cash-
based transactions. In fact, the top two categories would be 60% for cash-based transactions, and 
12% for wire transfers. This led the bank to apply a risk scoring system on top of the transactions 
for identifying the probability of ML-transacting (more on that in section 4.4.). This implied a 
stricter selection of pathways and entailed the risk of ignoring suspects that fell out of the scope 
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of what those choices reflected. The narrower selection recognized the need to find a better 
structural coupling between human and computer profiling.  
As Bank X concentrated in these 14 transacting categories for profiling ML, the TPR of the 
TMS increased to about 5-7%, while a model was created that sought to enhance profiling by 
integrating other sources of data. Based on project workshops and consolidating ML indicators, 
three other types of behaviours were identified as important: lifestyle, business, and criminal. It is 
beyond the scope of the present paper to deconstruct the details of each one, however, lifestyle 
and business behaviour are most closely related to the following section.  
4.3. The breakthrough in ML profiling of Bank X (relating to Phase 3 – Step 2) 
With transacting behaviour being viewed as just one relevant type to ML activities, the question 
that emerged was how could the profiling of money laundering be enhanced by using additional 
data, from either within the system or the environment? In one of the project meetings that led to 
interesting insights, the MLRO of Bank X said that: “…we realized that the marketing 
department of the bank had access to a (demographics) database that they use all the time… It 
took us quite a bit of time because at first they could not understand what we were saying 
(implying here about ML modeling). Until we put it in their language and said: How would you 
market a product to a money launderer? What sort of characteristics would you be looking for?”  
      Even though the exact profile was not disclosed for confidentiality concerns, the data 
categories that were used are listed in Table 3 (Phase 3, Step 2) and described here in brief. Bank 
X integrated these categories of data from the database of an off-the-shelf product that the 
marketing team had bought. The marketing team was using that database in order to target 
customer groups for particular products, for example, loans, credit cards, etc. While that database 
contained in excess of 60 micro-categories through which they were classifying the totality of the 
UK population, after several workshops between AML/Marketing teams, Bank X decided to 
focus on: i) key demographics (household, population, background) as these would yield 
additional information – at postcode level – for several different segments of the population, ii) 
socio-economics and consumption data (occupation structure, employment status, socio-economic 
status, spending, etc…) that would yield lifestyle and other characteristics that would be 
compared against transacting behaviour; for instance, if a customer was matched against a 
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category of a region where the socioeconomic indicators pointed to a deprived region (whereas 
the transacting behaviour of the customer gave a very different footprint) then along with the 
combination of his/her personal details, occupation, spending patterns, he/she could be flagged as 
a suspect; iii) property value and location (value, tax band, accessibility, urbanization) and 
financial measures (directorships, bad debt, credit behaviour) were also used routinely as an 
information pathway towards investments and business behaviour. Infiltrating businesses, 
investing in real estate (particularly in the London property market – a favorite of Mafiosi around 
the world), setting up cash-intensive businesses with high turnover within short periods of time 
from their establishment (e.g. restaurants), were just a few of the ML typologies that the bank was 
attempting to target from these last two categories.     
     A combination of the above elements was used to inform the profiling queries further and as 
disclosed by the MLRO, increased the TPRTMS to 17.3%. Here, it is worth mentioning that in 
AML technology use, TPRTMS is the key metric used widely by banks and the key decision 
makers in AML; through its monitoring, banks try to improve and justify their AML compliance 
efforts against central bank & regulatory audits on AML technology. But it is not just a 
performance measure. Banks change their algorithmic detection practices routinely in order to 
attempt to improve their TPR and by doing so, they change their operational focus on determining 
suspicious behaviour. In a sense, most AML-operations are guided by the need to improve the 
TPR but any such changes imply a shift in who is actually targeted for ML suspicious behaviour. 
The core findings/reflections in the limitations of the traditional transaction monitoring approach 
and the addition of marketing-oriented data are summarized below:  
a) Peaks and troughs in transactional activity do not give high enough returns of true positive 
identification of ML. There is an attempt to use any data that differ greatly from the norm. 
However, as the head of ML analysts always maintained: “good money launderers try to look like 
the norm”. This complicates matters considerably as ‘outlier detection’ techniques are not as 
useful as they are in fraud; profiling is conducted under conditions of considerable ambiguity. 
b)  Bank X found – accidentally – that high-risk customers for ML also matched a marketing 
demographics group that had greater propensity to apply for a loan; through that comparison they 
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identified key postcode areas as high-risk for ML; these later corresponded with some of the 
postcodes of the suspects that the Police arrested for terrorism after the 7/7 bombings in London.  
c) A simple profile that was originally developed and targeted ML-suspects that were: male, 38-45 
years of age, with an association to the bank between 3-5 years, and living in specific postcodes 
around the UK. This has changed considerably in profiling complexity.  
d) The initial model of Bank X looked at specifics such as: product holdings, income, balance of 
account, debit values compared to credit values, transaction timestamps and amounts overdrawn, 
number of transactions, types of transactions, number of debit card transactions, merchant 
categories where transactions take place, international location of transactions, time of association 
between customer and bank, etc. By approaching this as a problem of the system, its subsystems, 
and its environment, the bank included data related to the behaviour of money launderers, but 
turned to the structural development of the system itself (instead of merely modeling the 
behaviour of money launderers). Following the relative success of the approach, Bank X sought 
to extend its profiling activities by expanding the variety of data that would support the modeling 
of ML-behaviour. This included additional marketing data, referrals from staff members where 
the narrative part of the SARs would be analyzed for additional profiling indicators, Law 
Enforcement Agencies enquiries (e.g. when the police would request transacting data for an 
individual the bank would look at the indicators for this request, potential associates of the 
individual that could be involved in ML, etc), fraud data (including internal fraud), data from 
media sources (TV, Newspapers, etc), industry forums, etc. The rationale of Bank X behind 
integrating these sources is described is the table below (Table 2). A particular disconnect came 
with fraud data, described separately in section 4.5. However, what did make a difference and led 
to another step-change in the improvement of TPRTMS was the introduction of a scorecard system.  
4.4. Risk-based customization and scorecard development (Relating to phase 4) 
Due to the introduction of the risk-based approach in AML monitoring, banks in the UK (and 
globally) were encouraged to create risk-profiles for ML and tailor their own AML handling as 
they saw fit. Bank X chose to do this by attributing a risk score for ML to every single customer 
in the bank. First, the bank reverse-engineered the general categories from already-submitted 
SARs (corroborated by analysts) so that a general risk-scorecard-weighting system could be 
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developed. The scale used was 0 for the lowest risk weight and 5 for the highest. For instance, 
W1 was the assigned risk-code given to gender. If it was found that based on all former 
submissions (based on 10 years of SARs-data), men had a higher propensity to be reported further 
in a case due to their suspicious behaviour and engagement in ML, then a higher risk weight 
would be established based on gender (in this case W1Male=1.52 and W1Female=0.62). A number of 
different weights were issued and implemented (disclosed in Table 3 along with their numerical 
values). These risk weights would be assigned automatically to each customer and this would 
provide the analysts with an automated risk-score for any given customer that was forwarded to 
them for further investigation (either by the TMS or by staff). That risk-score was also using (and 
building upon) the marketing database; customer demographics, socio-economics, etc., were 
bundled into classifications (i.e. “buckets of risk” as the head of AML analysts called them) and 
these became variations of another risk weight (W7). For example, customers that – based on the 
marketing data – resided in certain high-risk postcodes (for ML purposes) were grouped into 
‘classification1’ and were given a score of 3.48 (out of 5) for that weight.  
     By applying these weights in an automated manner, the ML-analysts were given an additional 
indication whether the technology-generated alert was truly suspicious. A web based interface 
allowed analysts to get an instant customer ML-risk score at any time. However, on top of the 
quantitative metric that this risk provided, ML-analysts were asked to add an additional risk-
metric following their manual assessment (low-medium-high). The application of both created a 
composite risk and a further information/redundancy consideration; the case management system 
of the AML-team was scripted to combine the two ratings and produce the final risk factor. By 
using the risk weights as listed in Table 3, the TPR of the TMS was increased further to 20-22%. 
An important finding that the bank stressed was the retrospective fit of SARs cases as they were 
scored out by the AML risk-model. This gave the bank an additional indication of their ‘ML-
suspicious customers’. By applying the risk model to SARs cases, the bank found that about 10% 
of its customers (based on the characteristics assigned) had generated 50% of all SARs.  
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Table 2: Internal, external and self-referential structural couplings from the AML system  
 
ML-Profiling sources 
(S/E) 
Rationale for ML-profiling integration and restrictions Identified Structural 
Coupling 
Marketing data 
(System) 
The use of data from the marketing department has been one of the fundamental successes of Bank X 
in improving its TPR for money laundering profiling, as the marketing department held important 
demographic data that could be used/juxtaposed against transaction data.  
Internal between 
AML/Marketing 
departments.  
Suspicious Activity 
Reports (SARs) 
submitted from 
members of staff 
(System) 
The use of SARs intelligence internally has been critical in improving automated profiling as a 
feedback loop was essentially created between the two. As staff-initiated SARs for money laundering 
had a much higher TPR (following manual analysis from the AML team), isolation of raw transaction 
data that corresponds to customers who have been reported through this route, yielded insights about 
the suspicious clientele of the bank. This process is described in the context of the case study in four 
steps.  
Self-referential, 
reflexive/recursive 
where the AML dept., 
seeks to improve based 
on the data it owns 
Fraud data 
(System) 
As fraud is a very different phenomenon to ML, Bank X did not have much success in using fraud data 
for money laundering purposes with the MLRO arguing that these departments (i.e. fraud and AML) 
should remain separate and exchange financial intelligence when it makes sense. However, the 
conditions for how such an exchange could shape up ML-profiling efforts would demand further 
research. At a minimum, the stance of Bank X in this matter illustrates that the transferability of 
techniques from fraud to AML is not straightforward. Outlier detection used in fraud techniques is not 
easily transferable in AML (as in ML the suspects do their very best to look like the norm), fraud in 
banking often involves taking control of individual accounts (the owners of which have critical 
interests in reporting them).  
Internal between the 
AML department and 
the Fraud department – 
on exception and not a 
regular selection of 
conditions for 
interaction 
Enquiries from Law 
Enforcement Agencies 
(LEAs) 
(Environment) 
When an LEA makes a request to the bank for information (this is typically a request to hand-over 
transaction data for a specific period of time), then the bank may use the request as an information 
resource itself. In other words, if the request is related to the provision of information for a suspect that 
has an account with the bank, then the bank can explore further suspects by its own initiative (e.g. 
potential associates, family members).  
A classic 
system/environment 
structural coupling 
between Bank X and 
data triggered by LEAs 
Data from Media and 
Social Networking 
Services 
(Environment) 
Using information from public media is typically highly-unstructured and not systematic in any way. 
Banks can use XML feeds from news agencies to filter negative news on potential suspects and trigger 
alerts in the TMS through those. Also, a top international bank is using public data from Facebook for 
ML profiling purposes – clearly there are serious implications for privacy here that need to be taken 
into account. 
A classic 
system/environment 
structural coupling 
between Bank X and 
data by media sources 
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AML 
Phases 
(Types of) Data used by the Bank Approach taken in Bank X TPRTMS 
 
Phase 
1 
 
Raw transaction data that were filtered through the TMS based on applied queries  The vendor had provided 100 predefined SQL 
queries that were ‘profiling’ ML behaviour. 
Upon implementation the bank activated only 
7-8 queries. 
 
0.1% 
 
 
Phase 
2 
Raw transaction data that were filtered through the TMS based on applied queries Trial-and-error optimization of the 7-8 queries. 
Basic model contained at least 4 main elements 
that characterized a money-launderer: a) male, 
b) 25-40 years old, c) certain postcodes, d) 
account holder 2-5 years with Bank X 
 
1.42% 
Phase 
3 
Step 1: Extraction of account numbers of truly suspect launderers from Case 
Management System data (10 year period) after ML-analyst due diligence; application 
of account numbers to raw transaction data and subsequent visualized data of the 
launderers’ transactions (Datadesk – Appendix 1)  
Step 2: Introduced marketing data: Demographics (household, population, background), 
socio-economics and consumption (occupation, employment status, socio-economic 
status…), property value and location (value, tax band, accessibility, urbanization) and 
financial measures (directorships, bad debt, credit behaviour)    
 
 
 
see Appendix 1 for screenshots of Step 1 
Step1:  
5-7%  
 
Step 2 
17.3% 
 
Phase 
4 
Scorecard weighting Data* (0 low – 5 highest):  
W1) Gender: M (1.52), F (0.62), W2) Age Group risks: 25-34 (1.71), 18-24(1.66), 35-44 
(1.45), Under 18 (1.04), 45-54 (1.04), 55-64(0.71), 65+ (0.33), W3) Marital status: Single 
(1.90), Other (0.92), W4) Identification of high risk postcode groups: G1 (2.82), G2(1.3), 
G3 (0.83) …, W5) UK Residency: Non-resident (2.7), Resident: (1.0), W6) Directorship: 
Director (1.92), Non-Director (0.95), W7) AMLMARK (Marketing Database) Code: 
Classification1 (3.48), Class2 (1.32), … 
* Existing SARs cases (10 years of data) were used to calculate the weights and W7 was 
based on the marketing database classifications.  
Introduced customized scorecard for all 
customers 
 
10% of customers generated half of all SARs 
 
 
 
22-23% 
  
Table 3: Types of data used along the various profiling phases towards Bank X’s structural development towards AML; approach and True Positive Rate (TPR) 
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4.5. The AML/Fraud disconnect  
The expansion of the profiling elements to a wider variety of data sources created a number of 
difficulties for the bank. From the case, it became clear that simply including more data to target 
ML behaviour would not work. An important finding was the comingling of fraud/ML in the 
context of behavioural modelling and the difficulties that it created. In most cases, integrating 
insights from fraud data to ML profiling gave rise to suspects that were meaningless from an 
investigative perspective. According to the MLRO: “As phenomena, these are very different so it 
is difficult to make the claim that we can take data from one and use it to model the other. We are 
still looking into this area, but so far, we have failed”. While fraud rings were on the rise and the 
supply of fake ID documents (e.g. through www.confidentialaccess.com) resulted in large scale 
mortgage fraud, the bank found the convergence between fraud/ML to be particularly 
problematic. The reasons are summarized here: a) fraud precedes ML: fraud generates the 
illegally earned money that subsequently needs to be laundered; in this regard, fraud-detection 
techniques do not apply to the ML phenomenon per se, but only to stopping one of the many 
avenues for generating illegally-earned money, b) while VAT fraud (e.g. carousel fraud or 
Missing trader Intra-Community Fraud), or other types of fraud constitute predicate offences and 
may be flagged as such in the SARs submissions to assist further investigations (or pass onto 
relevant authorities like the HMRC if it involves tax evasion), from a behavioural profiling 
perspective ML is the intersection where all criminal activities meet; thus, the focus on detection 
should be on the process itself and finding mechanisms through which computer profiling and 
human profiling can be structurally coupled for the improvement of TPR; c) while the bank had 
implemented a TMS that was developed from a company with very strong anti-fraud solutions, 
the transferability of fraud-oriented transaction queries did not work well for Bank X. The exact 
zone of congruence in terms of detection could not be determined but this would be a subject for 
future exploration – if not a research agenda on its own.  
Similar difficulties were raised with the integration of other data sources, even though it 
became clear that the agenda and strategy for such integration was much broader. For example, 
the head of the ML analysts mentioned that they assigned one analyst to check news reports, 
newspaper articles, police announcements, etc., for information that they could check/integrate 
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for targeting ML. This was expanded later to include news feeds in XML format while, over time, 
profiling became more aggressive in how personal data were being used for monitoring purposes. 
Another bank in our project considered using Facebook data to profile customers’ lifestyle 
characteristics and juxtapose with transacting patterns. While out of scope for the present paper, 
this raises substantial privacy concerns; indeed, the European Commission has recently moved to 
suggest that Data Protection Authorities should be granted the right to veto AML legislation.  
 
4.6. Evaluating AML: lessons for AML management in banks, MLROs and regulators  
The study indicates that Money Laundering Reporting Officers (MLROs) that remain the key 
decision makers within a financial institution must make a clear separation between fraud and 
anti-money laundering if they seek to improve AML detection. As MLROs and Heads of AML 
departments use AML-technology systems to support their decisions in determining truly 
suspicious cases before these can be forwarded to FIUs, they need to approach money laundering 
detection systemically and look into a much more structured approach between technology and 
human co-improvement; for instance, training of staff and the improvement of the TPRstaff index 
can be fed back for improvements in detection. MLROs need to steer their departments from 
simply monitoring ML to deconstructing the transacting footprint of their own suspicious 
customers. The one-size-fits-all integration of SQL queries that capture ML typologies 
algorithmically has not worked. Furthermore, thus far, MLROs’ decisions to forward technology-
based suspicions for ML to the FIU have had an overall negative impact on national AML 
systems with skyrocketing SARs of poor quality (the vast majority of which are technology-
generated). If this situation is to be (partly) reversed, MLROs need to steer their AML 
departments and integrate technology monitoring for ML differently. More specifically, the 
specific sequence of Phases 1-4 as described above (based on raw transaction data filtering, 
reverse engineering of transaction from staff-identified suspicious cases – and their subsequent 
visualization, as well as the inclusion of specific marketing data in tandem with risk-based 
scorecards for which indicative weights have been provided), could yield considerable 
improvements in the TPRTMS. In turn, this can have a considerable positive impact for the AML 
management of the bank as it can demonstrate compliance, reduce costs of checking false 
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positives, avoid financial fines and contribute to the identification of illegal behaviour. 
Furthermore, regulators ought to encourage this approach and work with other key decision 
makers both in banks and other reporting entities to reach a consensus of how AML technology 
can be evaluated and audited in a more comprehensive way. In addition to the TPR that remains 
central and indicates how banks progressively customize their AML technology solutions to 
achieve better detection, the case shows that regulators must enhance their feedback mechanisms 
so that MLROs can develop their decisions and deconstruct what suspicious cases were fruitful 
for prosecution and asset recovery and which ones could be improved by changing internal 
processes. In this context, based on the insights from the case of Bank X, the following measures 
can be used in tandem with the TPR. These can be useful in managing AML systems, evaluating 
them, auditing them and considering their impact on MLROs and other key decision makers (both 
within the system and its environment). They can also be considered in light of future AML-IS 
technological developments (e.g. when designing analytics dashboards for MLROs so that there’s 
comprehensive AML monitoring). These are discussed briefly in the table below.  
 
AML Evaluation metrics Implications for key decision makers (MLROs & Head of AML) 
TPRTMS=[(CRML-Analysts/ATMS)*100]% 
and  
TPRStaff=[(CRML-Analysts/Astaff)*100]% 
where: 
CR: Corroborated reports by analysts 
ATMS: Alerts from the TMS 
AStaff: Alerts from branch staff 
Both of these measures are internal to the bank and MLROs should 
continuously support the improvement of both the TPRstaff (e.g. by 
enhancing AML training activities) and managing TPRTMS 
improvements. The two are structurally coupled. As key decision 
makers that rely on both staff and technology in establishing and 
forwarding suspicion for ML to the FIU, MLROs should seek to 
balance these measures with forwarding rates.  
RW(Analyst) = Wstaff-alerts/Wtechnology-alerts  
where 
Wstaff-alerts = (Allocated(Astaff)/AStaff) 
Wtech-alerts=(Allocated(ATMS)/ ATMS) 
Staff demotivation from false positives in managing ATMS needs to be 
managed by MLROs carefully so that their decisions for forwarding 
SARs can be based on high quality reports. A balance of the workload 
of ML-analysts should be maintained in how allocations are being 
conducted between the higher-quality alerts from staff (AStaff) and the 
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Where W is the workload for the 
ratio of ML-Alerts created by staff 
reports from branches and the TMS. 
much lower-quality alerts from technology (ATMS). Rotations of staff 
between the two would assist in managing this process. Technology 
should be optimized so that the workload ratio (Rw) for each analyst 
takes into account additional weights (probability of suspicion for 
ATMS and Astaff)  
(FRate)TOTAL = [(MLROdecisions-to-
forward)/(ATMS+AStaff)] 
 
(FRate)STAFF =(MLROdecisions-to-
forward/Astaff)   indicates how many 
alerts from branch staff are 
eventually forwarded to the FIU 
following an MLRO decision 
 
(FRate)TECH =(MLROdecisions-to-
forward/ATMS)  similarly for 
technology 
The decision for an internally corroborated report to be forwarded to 
the FIU rests with the MLRO. The forwarding rates (representing this 
decision) should be monitored closely in relation to both ATMS and 
AStaff. Very high forwarding rates where low TPRs exist have a 
negative impact to FIUs that are struggling to cope with the volume of 
reports. MLROs should safeguard the process of corroborated reports 
by analysts instead of amplifying any ambiguities and forwarding 
everything for consideration. In addition, FIUs can provide feedback 
for the adjustments of this, by informing MLROs of criteria/cases that 
are helpful in prosecutions. Some FIUs are doing this in a handful of 
countries but this is neither structured nor part of an AML evaluating 
strategy that involves both staff and technology.  
VSuspect categories = Yselected(Astaff)/Xcategories  
where X the total number of 
transacting categories (99 for Bank 
X), Y the selected subset that 
originates from staff alerts and V the 
variety of transacting categories. 
Delineating the suspect transacting categories for a bank focuses the 
scope of profiling and can also be used to monitor the variety of 
transacting categories exploited over time by money launderers. This 
gives an indication of the variety of the suspects’ transacting footprint. 
The closer V is to zero, the more focused the selected categories 
become based on Astaff. A result closer to the number one would imply 
a very wide variety and no real reduction in transacting complexity.  
CStaff = (ATMS+Astaff)/CR 
Cstaff: staff capacity to analyze alerts 
With the daily capacity of members of staff to corroborate reports (CR) 
being limited, the alerts of the TMS (ATMS) needs to be optimized so 
that ATMS+AStaff does not exceed the capacity of staff to analyze 
reports. 
 
 
Table 3: Evaluation metric considerations 
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5. Discussion  
5.1. Implications for practice & contributions 
Abstracting from the case, we can look to implications for institutions that try to improve in their 
handling of AML. One important aspect is that the (AML) system, in its efforts to reduce the 
complexity of the environment, is forced to succumb to a default two-step reduction of 
environmental complexity. The first step involves complexity reduction via technology: data from 
the environment are internalized by the system, which trigger algorithms based on what 
phenomenon is being modeled. The second step is a follow-up complexity-reduction by human 
activity systems. As shown in Table 1, the (AML) system develops three types of structural 
couplings for TPR improvements: i) internal (between itself as a subsystem of the bank and other 
departments like marketing), ii) self-referential (with AML recursive explorations like that in 
Phase 3 – step 1), iii) classic/external types of structural couplings with the environment of the 
bank. These should not be thought of as distinct but as intertwined, affecting ML modeling efforts 
in complex ways. They are depicted in the conceptual model as [A], [B], and [C].  
     The concept of structural coupling and the findings from the case study alert us to the critical 
dynamics between computer profiling (CP) and human profiling (HP). These impose restrictions 
on each other: CP is essential to filter the massive volume of transactions and flag suspected cases 
by reducing behaviour (lifestyle, business) into models that can be monitored. While human 
profiling is typically perceived as an afterthought to CP, the case of AML illustrates that HP 
places severe restrictions that need to be built into the profiling efforts. This re-emphasizes the 
relationship between CP and HP while structural coupling helps us reconsider HP, not as a 
residual category to CP, but as constitutive to it. This change in emphasis implies that profiling a 
phenomenon must be seen as an exercise far beyond the computational modeling of a domain 
(like ML) as HP reconstitutes the way CP is considered. In this context, structural coupling also 
helps us reframe the traditional distinction between computer/human profiling into a highly 
asymmetric relationship between information/redundancy. In domains like AML where we have 
high-ambiguity phenomena (e.g. where we try to model, detect and evaluate suspicious behavior), 
information systems must be considered as redundancy systems first: systems where the reduction 
of environmental complexity takes precedence; systems where data (e.g. about suspicious 
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behaviour in ML) is at the environment of the system and it is only through highly selective 
conditionings that reduce its potentiality that it can become information. The following 
conceptual framework synthesizes the aspects brought forward (and abstracted) from the case 
study and offers a systems theoretical model of ML monitoring, grounded on the concept of 
structural coupling.  
 
Figure 1: Systems theoretical framework for ML monitoring 
In ML, the identification of suspicious behaviour and its consequences are more challenging and 
technology constructs suspicious behaviour (and its identification). The norm against which 
outliers are constructed is very different and much more challenging to fraud (where the victims 
are the customers). This has implications for profiling, for how information systems are designed, 
developed, implemented, and also audited. An important implication for IS is that the ‘normal’ 
interaction between ‘computer’ and ‘human profiling’ mutates into a massive information- 
redundancy structural coupling in high-ambiguity domains. IS scholars exploring such high-
ambiguity domains will benefit from the framework by rendering any computer/human profiling 
interactions onto an information/redundancy structural coupling and are prompted to: a) explore 
and integrate lifestyle, business and criminal behaviour as a different set of behaviours in tandem 
with transacting behaviour,  b) separate AML from fraud as discussed in section 4.6., and explore 
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what internal structural couplings would be most beneficial for the AML system in the context of 
profiling (e.g. marketing), c) take into account the regulating elements [illustrated as e1, e2, … en] 
that influence the process of structural coupling between CP/HP and build them into any future 
profiling; these can also be taken into account in IS development, implementation, audit, and can 
also double as evaluation metrics presented to a dashboard to the two key decision makers in a 
bank (i.e. Head of AML analysts, Money Laundering Reporting Officer); acknowledging the 
structural coupling between the two ‘turns the tables’ on AML profiling and prompts for the 
integration of HP-oriented indicators in the refinement of CP (e.g. adjusting algorithms so that 
human demotivation, workload, forwarding rates are taken into account alongside the modeling 
of the ML-behaviour), d) explore how feedback from the FIU should be enhanced so that decision 
makers can adjust the structural coupling between CP/HP within financial institutions, e) reflect 
and explore further the conditions under which the asymmetry between information and 
redundancy shapes the construct of suspicion in AML; f) consider how profiling decisions create 
redundancy (e.g. in eliminating some suspects over others) and, g) what additional evaluation 
metrics can be developed in the context of AML.   
In this context, the structural coupling between CP and HP in the theoretical model is considered 
to be the core of the conceptual model and alerts us to a number of systems theoretical conditions 
that are important for ML monitoring. First, the way CP considerations inform any AML 
behavioural modeling effort can now be reversed in light of the structural coupling. For example, 
instead of handling CP on its own and ending up with a cost of £450,000 for checking false 
positives, the financial cost of checking for false positives can become part of the modeling effort 
(though as we’ve said, liabilities can be far greater in cases of financial fines for non-compliance). 
Thus, the TMS that is supposed to ‘detect ML behaviour and generate alerts must be optimized to 
produce a number of alerts that would be financially viable for the AML system. Second, any 
restrictions posed by HP that are usually ignored in the context of behavioural modeling, or 
treated as an after-thought, must be factored into the profiling dynamics. For instance, ML-
analysts typically become demotivated by having to check such a large volume of false positives 
and this affects their own performance in conducting checks for real suspicion. Thinking about 
this problem systemically – and through the structural coupling between CP/HP, turns the tables 
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(so to speak) on this problem. Thus, the identification of staff demotivation (as an AML problem) 
when struggling to evaluate false positives might be considered as a prerequisite to adjust 
computer profiling by rotating the allocation of technology-generated alerts to different members 
of staff based on the probability for suspicion. While human profiling is typically treated as an 
after-effect in information systems and a residual category, structural coupling tells us that it must 
be built into profiling. In this manner, the scorecard development at Phase 4 could include an 
additional weight, W8, which would assign a probability of demotivation to a ML-analyst if a 
large number of low-risk alerts had been assigned to him/her that – following analysis – turned 
out as false positives. In this way, the distribution of high-risk TMS alerts would be conducted in 
a way that would be conducive to increased vigilance. Structural coupling alerts us to the need to 
consider not only the behavioural modeling of money launderers but also of ML-analysts.  
The systemic rationale for this applies to many different elements (indicated as general 
conditions [e1… en] in the model). Individual considerations for either side of the CP/HP 
structural coupling (say the cost of checking false positives from a HP perspective), transcend one 
side of the CP/HP distinction and affect the other side as well. For example, abstracting from the 
bank, these include: e1) cost of checking false positives, e2) capacity for human profiling (i.e. 
how many alerts can be manually investigated per day), e3) balancing the percentage of analyzing 
technology-generated alerts that have a low TPR vs staff-generated alerts from branches that have 
a much higher (up to 60%) TPR, e4) staff demotivation, etc. It can also include environmental 
restrictions; for example, the FIU capacity to investigate SARs could be fed back to individual 
AML systems based on what FIUs perceive as information vs redundancy; in turn, the AML 
system (Bank X) would optimize its SARs output. Unfortunately, FIUs generally give minimal or 
often no feedback and without this type of (environment-to-system) coupling, initiated by the 
FIU, banks operate as black-boxes that output noise (i.e. redundancy) instead of information. This 
affects FIUs adversely. This appears to be the case for most AML-national systems around the 
world and constitutes one of the most critical obstacles to developing AML practice further. 
     At the same time, any potential TPR improvements should consider all types of structural 
couplings: internal with other subsystems, external and self-referential/recursive improvements. 
Phases 1-4 as discussed in the case study would relate to internal and self-referential 
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improvements in the TPR and outline the practical contribution of the study. Of particular interest 
could be social media data and how they might impact CP/HP. In the context of the framework, 
the argument can be made that within a bank, despite the fact that ML-detection is a legal 
requirement, the details of who exactly is being ‘detected’, monitored, and produced in a list of 
suspects remains an emergent phenomenon, based on different forms of structural coupling as 
identified above. Here, a significant concern must be raised over aspirations to engage in real-
time detection [23]. In that case, algorithms alone would largely define criminality.  
     While the concept of the structural coupling denotes the form of the interaction between the 
system and its environment [50, 51, 62], it is not very clear in what way data is transformed into 
information other than the claim that a system is capable of effecting this transformation [48].  
Viewed from this outlook, structural coupling does capture the co-dependency between 
system/environment [51] but we find that it is structured via the system’s predisposition to engage 
with selected ‘data sources’ and externalize them as information, as well as the evolving 
dynamics between information/redundancy. The transition then from data to information is 
facilitated through the dynamic demands that computer profiling and human profiling place on 
each other: this interaction between CP and HP guides the distinction between 
information/redundancy so that meaningful decision-making can take place within an 
organization. While we are in agreement with Vanderstraeten [53, p.258], that information 
emerges as a product of the system, we find that this is instantiated in information systems 
through a negotiation between CP/HP. Applied to AML and based on the developed conceptual 
framework, suspicious behaviour then is the product of the AML system, based on the 
multiplicity of structural couplings (internal, external, self-referential). In fact, we can observe 
that all of the profiling efforts of Bank X were geared to reduce the complexity of the ML-
characteristics and reach a more manageable subset of suspicious cases for ML-analysts. In this 
way, the information-value of data, and what can be recognized as useful information (instead of 
redundancy), is only realized after it is internalized within the system. For example, the exact 
same transaction data for customer A can be information for the fraud department but redundant 
for the AML department. Subsystems will exercise their own internal structural couplings 
between CP and HP.  
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     While the key theoretical contribution of this paper is the systems-theoretically-oriented 
conceptual model, the identification of different types of structural couplings and recognition of 
their interactions on an information/redundancy level also contributes to systems theory (the 
concept of structural coupling in particular). In this context, structural coupling can now be 
perceived as the totality of inter-related system/environment couplings, even when the 
environment is the system itself (in case of a self-referential, recursive application of the 
concept). On the basis of how the system evaluates its own structural development or drift, the 
system can adjust the sensitivity of its boundary and modify its structural couplings with the 
environment (e.g. adopt data from other sources, ask additional data from customers, etc). As we 
have seen the system can even mitigate its structural drift by accepting its own redundancy as a 
legitimate form of information output (e.g. not scrutinizing all SARs carefully in order to avoid 
the cost of analysis and passing a volume of useless SARs to the FIU). In this regard, systems do 
not always optimize their structural coupling based on information and structural development, 
but also based on accepting redundancy and structural drift. The unavoidable consequence is that 
carving such pathways through which the (AML) system internalizes data runs an important risk 
in AML: criminal suspects may be informed of how their behaviour is being modeled 
algorithmically and so avoid detection altogether.  
5.2. Study Limitations 
A number of limitations are acknowledged. First, the UK banking environment and the national 
regulatory practices create a unique set of contingencies. While a degree of generalizability is 
claimed in the development of the framework in Figure 1, it is recognized that ML techniques 
often change from one country to another. Also, the transacting behaviour of ‘ML suspects’ is 
dependent on the economic landscape of different countries and the institutionalization of specific 
modes of transacting (e.g. other economies are much more cash-based in transacting within the 
EU, the use of cheques in the US is much more widespread, and so on). A second limitation 
within the context of bank X was posed by the difficulty in getting access to additional 
departments other than the AML group (part of the compliance department). 
 5.3. Suggestions for future research 
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AML is under-researched in IS so there are multiple opportunities for further research. First, a 
wide range of different technologies influence AML and these require further examination [63]. 
These include case management systems, sanction control systems, intranets, etc. Also, industry 
matters within IS research considerably [64] and taken that the securities industry, exchange 
bureaux, insurance companies, casinos, credit card companies, the energy sector, retail, football, 
real estate, non-profit organizations, and so on, are amidst a large number of industries 
affected/exploited by money launderers (and where technology plays a critical role in detection/ 
monitoring/ prevention), the scope is truly vast. Finally, following up from the findings of our 
project, we tried to expand our research agenda and conduct benchmarking of TPRs across 
multiple financial institutions within the City of London. All of the banks approached, declined to 
participate and cited confidentiality concerns in case of possible leaks (the implication is that if a 
very low – relative – score became known, it might signal a bank’s AML weaknesses and attract 
active money laundering or cause reputational harm). This is an area that we prompt others to 
explore; developments in distributed forms of anonymized tools could facilitate this process.  
6. Conclusion 
The present study highlights the critical dynamics between computer profiling and human 
profiling in an AML organizational context. The rich context of the case study and the 
longitudinal nature of this work, advances our understanding on AML detection, provides an 
approach to key decision makers (e.g. MLROs) that can be implemented towards AML 
improvements, delineates a series of steps that a bank can take and provides reflections on key 
AML evaluation metrics (TPR and others in section 4.6) that are useful to both banks and 
regulators. This new study contextualises AML detection within the structural coupling of 
computer/human profiling, re-orients the rationale of AML profiling by emphasizing contingent 
human profiling elements that are often ignored in profiling and disentangles AML from fraud, 
thereby prompting IS scholars to study AML separately. The ensemble of these contributions 
offers practical guidance for banks that seek to develop their AML monitoring strategies and 
prompts IS researchers for additional work in this space: not only from a purely technical-
orientation but also from a deeper exploration of the organizational dynamics that affect ML-
monitoring and the key decision makers in an AML system and its environment.  
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Appendix 1 (Relating to Phase 3 – step 1):  
 
   
Figure A1:  
Visualization of a dataset that money 
laundering analysts would explore/interact 
with in the context of the project in order to 
reflect about the qualitative characteristics of 
suspicious ML-behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2:  
Reduction of the suspicious complexity. From the 99 
transaction codes recorded in the legacy system, the 
isolated suspicious transactions from the money launderers 
would indicate that only 14 categories were dominant. The 
largest area (cash-based transactions) would be present in 
more than 60% of suspicions.  
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